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AUTHOR George Younger 
Lam currenUy a senior at the University of Kentucky double majoring in philosophy and history, and I plan 
on attending law school in the fall of 2006. This essay was 
written as a term paper for Dan Breazeale's course on 
Nietzsche. During the fall semester of 2004, we read every-
thing that Nietzsche wrote that was published in his life-
time. By the end of the course (and after writing twenty-one 
reaction papers) this final essay basically wrote itself. This 
was easily the best course I have ever taken. Dr. Breazeale 
deserves much of the credit, but Nietzsche deserves quite a 
bit as well (if it had been a course on Plato or Descartes 
then it would not have affected me as it did) . Though I had 
read some Nietzsche before this course, it was not until this 
course that I really discovered Nietzsche. The subject of 
free will has interested me for years. As a freshman I came 
to the conclusion that it did not exist, though it was not 
until reading Nietzsche that I found a philosopher who 
would back me up . 
Daniel Breazeale 
Professor of Philosophy 
Distinguished Professor Arts and Sciences 2005-2006 
The relationship between "Freedom and Necessity" is one of the most vexing 
and controversial issues in all of Nietzsche scholarship. George Younger's treat-
ment of U1e issues involved is balanced and mature, and his analysis is based 
upon a thorough - indeed, virtually complete - familiarity with the relevant 
texts. His interpretation of the famous "doctrine of eternal recurrence," which 
many view as a serious obstacle to any efforts to impute to Nietzsche a robust 
defense of human freedom, is ingenious and plausible. Indeed, one suspects 
that Nietzsche hin1self would have welcomed Mr. Younger's "practical" (rather 
than metaphysical or theoretical) interpretation of this doctrine. In the end, Mr. 
Younger defends a "deterministic" reading of ietzsche's position, while insist-
ing (in good Nietzschean fashion) upon boU1 the utility of the belief in free will 
and the even greater dangers inherent in that same belief, understood as an 
effort to impugn reality itself. Here again fue empha is i upon the practical 
objections to the belief in metaphysical freedom and the practical advantages of 
the doctrine of amor fati. The same virtue that distin!!Ui h Mr. Younger's dis-
cussion of freedom and nece ity a! o d1aracteriz hi judiciou di cussion of 
the relationship between "idea!i m" and ··realism" in ietzscbe's Thu Spoke 
Zarathustra, a particularly intriguino feature f v hid1 i hi bold distinction 
between Zarathustra's own an1bivalent bl nd of reali m and ideali m and 
Nietzsche's own uncompromising realism. 
Nietzsche could truthfully be identified as one 
of the greatest philosophers of human freedom. 
On the other hand, it would be just as accurate 
to describe Nietzsche as one of history's great-
est opponents to human freedom because he 
asserts unequivocally that free will does not ex-
ist. Universal necessity must be accepted as the 
very basis of Nietzsche's metaphysics. Many 
writings of Nietzsche concern this metaphysical 
unfreedom, yet his Thus Spoke Zarathustra pro-
vides perhaps the greatest "handbook" to hu-
man freedom that the world has ever known. 
The discrepancy that arises between human free-
dom and universal necessity does so because 
Nietzsche never explicitly attempts to reconcile 
these ideas. I attempt to reconcile this discrep-
ancy by distinguishing between the metaphysi-
cal level (in which free will cannot exist) and 
the practical level (in which the illusion free will 
could never be entirely eliminated). In terms 
of Nietzsche himself, we must distinguish be-
tween Nietzsche the metaphysician and 
Nietzsche the philosopher. Though there was 
never an explicit reconciliation of freedom and 
necessity in Nietzsche's 
works, there exists, how-
ever, a powerful, implicit 
reconciliation in the fig-
ure of Zarathustra. I be-
lieve Zarathustra alone 
illustrates how one actu-
ally lives the coexistence 
of freedom and necessity. 
Friedrich Nietzsche 
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'7n every word he contradicts, 
this most Yes-saying of all spirits; 
in him all opposites are blended into a new unity. "1• 2 
Nietzsche is referring to Zarathustra, the hero of his 
Thus Spoke Zarathustra, but this passage aptly de-
scribes Nietzsche as well. When scholars think of 
Nietzsche, often "unity" is furthest from their minds. 
He appears to contradict himself from one sentence 
to the next, allowing many readers to discount con-
flicting ideas in his writings. It is unfortunate that so 
many of his ideas are discredited simply because they 
do not conform readily to one another. It is the task 
of the student of Nietzsche to find the proper perspec-
tive from which they can be reconciled with each other 
- the perspective from which "all opposites are 
blended into a new unity." 
One such task involves the reconciliation of 
Nietzsche's ideas on freedom. Nietzsche never wavers 
from his assertion that there is absolutely no "'free-
dom of the will' in the superlative metaphysical sense, 
which still holds sway, unfortunately, in the minds of 
the half-educated. "3 Free will is acknowledged as just 
one among many illusions of mankind. Despite the 
fact that "the single human being is a piece of fatum 
from the front and from the rear, "4 Nietzsche proceeds 
to describe how one "becomes free." His books from 
Human, All Too Human to The Gay Science illustrate 
the development of the "free spirit," "a spirit that has 
become free, that has again taken possession of itself. "5 
Zarathustra teaches men freedom, or, more pre-
cisely, the freedom of a creator. Why would Nietzsche 
teach freedom if he knew that ultimately this very 
freedom was an illusion? It is because at heart 
Nietzsche is a philosopher. He has employed the quali-
ties of the scientist, the scholar, the metaphysician, 
and the cosmologist to show that there is no free will 
on the metaphysical level. But on tl1e practical level 
(the level of illusion, the level in which mankind must 
exist and suffer, the level that even Nietzsche cannot 
escape) mankind can have "freedom" to tile full ex-
tent that an individual can become free. Nietzsche the 
metaphysician ends his work content with the knowl-
edge that freedom does not exist. However, Nietzsche 
the philosopher is concerned primarily with the prac-
tical level; his concern is what is done with the knowl-
edge of unfreedom. On this level, Nietzsche (along 
with other spirits that have become free) must utilize 
a practical freedom to tackle "the problem of value, 
the determination of the order of rank among values. "6 
We must begin the exploration of freedom on tile 
metaphysical level. The first time that Nietzsche pro-
clainls that there is no free will is in section 106, "By 
the waterfall," of Human, All Too Human, and it deserves to be quoted 
in its entirety: 
At the sight of a waterfall we think we see in the countless 
curvings, twistings and breakings of the waves capriciousness 
and freedom of will; but everything here is necessary, every 
motion mathematically calculable. So it is too in the case of 
human actions; if one were all knowing, one would be able to 
calculate every individual action, likewise every advance in 
knowledge, every error, every piece of wickedness. The actor 
himself, to be sure, is fixed in the illusion of free will; if for one 
moment the wheel of the world were to stand still, and tl1ere 
were an all-knowing, calculating intelligence there to make use 
of this pause, it could narrate the future of every creature to the 
remotest ages and describe every track along which tllis wheel 
had yet to role. The actor's deception regarding himself, tl1e 
assumption of free-will, is itself part of the mechanism it would 
have to compute. 7 
At tllis preliminary stage, free will does not exist because everytlling 
could be calculated and predicted, but all of tl1e elements of universal 
necessity can be found in tllis passage. Here, the illusion of the "actor" 
is first proposed and, as well, the notion that action itself is an illusion. 
One also gets the sense that no specific "cause and effect" can be iso-
lated from this whole- tl1at every part of the waterfall (or of our world) 
is completely connected to every other part. Nietzsche uses tl1e imagery 
of the rolling wheel to illustrate the "unfolding" nature of reality. "By 
the waterfall" asserts that everything is calculable and necessary but 
does not attempt to prove it; for proof of these premises one must delve 
deeper into Nietzsche's cosmology. 
Upon an initial orientation with tile idea of complete unfreedom (of 
complete necessity), an individual may assume that he or she has no free 
will simply because of "cause and effect. " If one does not believe in a 
"soul" that is the product of some divine endowment (which really must 
be a starting point for a student of Nietzsche) , til en what is left in the 
world besides cause and effect? An action that I perform (an effect) 
seems like no more than the product of some cause[s]. But this 
interpretation is not the interpretation of Nietzsche; it is a misinterpretation 
of reality. To someone who has finally "seen through the boorish simplicity 
of tllis celebrated concept of 'free will"' Nietzsche says, "I beg of him to 
carry his 'enlightenment' a step further, and also put out of his head the 
contrary of tllis monstrous conception of ' free will' : I mean 'unfree will,' 
which amounts to a misuse of cause and effect. "8 Cause and effect are 
not the origin of our unfreedom: 
Cause and effect: such a duality probably never exists; in truth 
we are confronted by a continuum out of which we isolate a 
couple of pieces, just as we perceive motion only as isolated 
points and then infer it without ever actually seeing it. The 
suddenness with which many effects stand out misleads us; 
actually there is an infinite number of processes that elude us.9 
A "continuum" is one way to describe the nature of reality, and it is 
Nietzsche's interpretation of reality. The implications of this "continuum" 
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are staggering. If the universe is a continuum, then 
the concept of identity is an illusion. Other illusions, 
misinterpretations, and errors "include the following: 
that there are equal things; that there are things, 
substances, bodies; that a thing is what it appears to 
be; that our will is free; that what is good for me is 
also good in itself. "10 
The interpretation of reality that humanity has 
come to accept as fact is based on natural laws. These 
laws are an attempt to implant order into our world 
and reduce something strange to something familiar. 
However, Nietzsche counsels us to "beware of saying 
that there are laws in nature. There are only necessi-
ties . "11 He states, "The total character of the world, 
however, is in all eternity chaos - in the sense not of 
a lack of necessity but of a lack of order[ ... ]." 
The lack of order referred to here is a lack of pur-
pose, not a lack of calculability. There is no purpose 
to the world in the sense that a "god" created us for a 
purpose or that we have some special reason for ex-
isting. Some might see a lack of order as proof that 
humanity has free will because there would be no 
laws to bind anyone. Nietzsche counters this attitude 
by asserting, "[The world] has a 'necessary' and 'cal-
culable' course, not because laws obtain in it, but 
because they are absolutely lacking, and every power 
draws its ultimate consequences at every moment. "12 
There are an infinite number of possible interpreta-
tions of natural phenomena, and Nietzsche acknowl-
edges that his is just another interpretation: 
Supposing that this also is only interpreta-
tion - and you will be eager enough to make 
this objection? - well, so much the better. 13 
One might assume from this statement that all 
interpretations are equal; however, this is not true. 
The interpretation of the physicist is a misinterpreta-
tion because it is based on error. Nowhere did 
Nietzsche claim that his interpretation was true while 
all others were false, yet the reader has to infer as 
much. He did not interpret the nature of reality dif-
ferently simply for his own pleasure; Nietzsche be-
lieved that his interpretation was a better 
approximation of "the way things are." 
So how is it that Nietzsche was "more right"14 
and everyone else (who experience natural laws such 
as gravity daily) so consistently wrong? How could 
the tremendous error of identity develop in the mind 
of humanity? The answer lies in our evolution and 
survival: 
Those, for example, who did not know how 
to find often enough what is "equal" as re-
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gards both nourishment and hostile animals 
- those, in other words, who subsumed 
things too slowly and cautiously - were fa-
vored with a lesser probability of survival than 
those who guessed immediately upon en-
countering similar instances that they must 
be equal. The dominant tendency, however, 
to treat as equal what is merely similar- an 
illogical tendency, for nothing is really equal 
- is what first created any basis for logic. 
[ ... ] The beings that did not see so precisely 
[the changes in things] had an advantage over 
those that saw everything "in flux. "15 
Those humans who saw the world as it is, in a 
state of flux, would have died out a long time ago. A 
creature who could recognize "a snake" for "a snake" 
would have had the advantage over a creature who 
saw a snake as a completely new thing (or could not 
distinguish the snake as "a thing" in the first place). 
Similarly, those who saw a "cause and effect" in natural 
phenomena had the advantage over those who could 
not. It is not wrong to see things in terms of cause 
and effect; they have been fundamental to our sur-
vival, and even now we could not function without 
t11ese concepts. Nietzsche believed that cause and 
effect should only be used "as conventional fictions 
for the purpose of designation and communication -
not for explanations," 16 meaning that they should only 
be used practically and not metaphysically. 
In survival lay the primary origin of illusion, in-
cluding the illusion of free will. Free will originates in 
the concept of the "ego," which is a result of the de-
velopment of consciousness. Nietzsche understands 
consciousness as accidental to humanity's existence, 
not essential: 
For we can think, feel, will, and remember, 
and we could also "act" in every sense of 
that word, and yet none of all this would have 
to "enter our consciousness" (as one says 
metaphorically). The whole of life would be 
possible without, as it were, seeing itself in a 
mirror. Even now, for that matter, by far the 
greatest portion of our life actually takes place 
without this mirror effect. [ .. . ] For what pur-
pose, then, any consciousness at all when it 
is in the main superfluous? 17 
Nietzsche's answer is that "consciousness has 
developed only under the pressure of the need for com-
munication:" 18 
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As the most endangered animal, he needed 
help and protection, he needed his peers, he 
had to learn to express his distress and to 
make himself understood; and for all of this 
he needed "consciousness" first of all, he 
needed to "know" himself and what dis-
tressed him, he needed to "know" how he 
felt, he needed to "know" what he thought. 19 
Therefore, "the development of language and the 
development of consciousness[ ... ] go hand in hand. "20 
Nietzsche repeatedly stresses that the development of 
these capacities was not the result of evolution to-
ward perfection. On the contrary, the fact that con-
sciousness and language developed demonstrates that 
humans were sick because they could no longer rely 
on their instincts: 
In this new world they no longer possessed 
their former guides, their regulating, uncon-
scious and infallible drives: they were re-
duced to thinking, inferring, reckoning, 
coordinating cause and effect, these unfor-
tunate creatures; they were reduced to their 
"consciousness," their weakest and most 
fallible organ! 21 
Nietzsche describes consciousness as "the most 
superficial and worst part" of thinking, and states that 
"whatever becomes conscious becomes by the same 
token shallow," because consciousness involves "cor-
ruption, falsification, reduction to superficialities, and 
generalization. "22 Language, too, relies on these false 
generalizations. For an individual to speak he must 
lie. Language operates by naming and classifying 
objects as well as finding relationships between them. 
It relies on the fundamental assertions of identity and 
equality. However, these concepts are merely illusions 
and errors. They only exist in our minds because 
these illusions were (and still are) necessary for our 
survival. 
With the development of consciousness and lan-
guage came the development of the "ego." This "ego" 
is responsible for the feeling that an "I" actually per-
forms an action, and this action is done of one 's own 
free "will. " In reality, however, there is no "will" ly-
ing behind every action. Language helps propagate 
the feeling of freedom because it separates a subject 
from its action. The "ego" is another illusion that 
developed for means of survival. The result of its 
development is the belief that there is an autonomous 
actor behind every action. However, the actor cannot 
be separated from the action: 
For just as popular mind separates the lightning from its flash 
and takes the latter fo r an action, for the operation of a subject 
called lightning, so popular morality also separates strength from 
expression of strength, as if there were a neutral substratum 
behind the strong man, which was free to express strength or 
not to do so . But there is no substratum; there is no "being" 
behind doing, effecting, becoming; "the doer" is merely a fiction 
added to the deed - the deed is everything. Popular mind in 
fact doubles the deed; when it sees the lightning, it is the deed 
of a deed: it posits the same event firs t as cause and then a 
second time as effect.23 
Because of humanity's use of language, it cannot free itself 
from this error. In language, "the fundamental errors of reason 
[ ... ] are petrified. "24 
This brings us to an essential question of Nietzschean philosophy: is 
it possible to live in an illusion if one knows it is an illusion? The specific 
instance that concerns this paper is whether one can live in the illusion 
of free will if one knows that, in fact, it does not exist. I believe that the 
answer to this question can be surmised from an examination of the 
origins of humanity's great illusions. Some popular illusions, like that of 
God or of a metaphysical good and evil, came only very recently in the 
development of man. These illusions could be eliminated, and not only 
would humanity continue to function properly in their absence, but we 
would be better off with them gone. However, man never chose to de-
velop consciousness or to recognize identity; it simply happened. The 
human mind changed in such a way as to be incapable of seeing r~ality 
in flux or reality as a continuum. There are some illusions that cannot 
be eliminated from the mind of an individual. Free will is one such 
illusion because it is now bound with the concept of "ego." 
How is it possible that Nietzsche can profess knowledge of this "con-
tinuum" and our "unfreedom" if his mind does not possess the capacity 
to see these things? I would argue that while Nietzsche knows these 
truths, he cannot live these truths. He has had moments of "enlighten-
ment" in the sense that he recognizes the essential accuracy of an idea, 
but as a human he is forced to interpret this truth; he is forced to see it 
through perspectives. This passage helps to explain this process of en-
lightenment or discovery: 
Only we have created the world that concerns man! - But pre-
cisely this knowledge we lack, and when we occasionally catch 
it for a fleeting moment we always forget it again irnmediately.25 
When one comes to an insight about the nature of the world it is not 
forever fixed in consciousness. Even if it could be forever fixed in our 
consciousness, this insight would now fall victim to the "corruption, 
falsification, reduction to superficialities, and generalization"26 that is 
consciousness. We know that almost all of our thoughts and actions 
never reach consciousness, that they take place unconsciously. If the 
knowledge of illusions (such as free will) cannot properly be understood 
consciously, perhaps the home for this knowledge is in the unconscious? 
For this to be the case, humanity would have to have an instinctual 
understanding of the true nature of reality. This is not the case. We have 
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evolved in such a way that a human being now sees 
identity, equality, and opposites instinctually. There-
fore, the knowledge of universal necessity has no 
natural home in the human being, neither in the con-
scious mind nor the unconscious mind. 
In response to the initial question (whether one 
could intentionally live in illusion if it were recog-
nized as illusion), we now have to say that this ques-
tion is irrelevant; although we can know that these 
fundamental errors of reason are errors, we cannot 
live this knowledge. What about specific cases that 
seem to prove that humanity is capable of living this 
knowledge? For instance, if we abolish our current 
criminal justice system (because it is based on the 
idea that everyone possesses free will and is ultimately 
responsible for his or her actions) is that not a means 
of living the knowledge? To a degree it could be de-
scribed as living in a world that recognizes universal 
necessity. To a degree humans could change much 
of their current activity and base it on this new un-
derstanding. 
Nietzsche describes how one would live with this 
knowledge: 
He may no longer praise, no longer censure, 
for it is absurd to praise and censure nature 
and necessity. As he loves a fine work of art 
but does not praise it since it can do nothing 
for itself, as he stands before the plants, so 
must he stand before the actions of men and 
before his own. He can admire their strength, 
beauty, fullness, but he may not find any 
merit in themY 
However, even Nietzsche must ultimately live his 
life in illusion. On the level of daily life, he must act 
as though he has an "ego" that performs actions, 
and he must see identity in objects. He cannot es-
cape this, because he is human. If Nietzsche could 
live in a world without identity then he would not be 
able to speak. (In fact, Nietzsche did not speak for 
the last eleven years of his life: 1889-1900. Is this 
evidence that Nietzsche moved on to a higher plane 
of existence? Probably not.) 
At this point it would be easy to take the next 
step and ascribe to reality a dual nature: the "true" 
world and the "apparent" world. The apparent world 
would be that which our consciousness has created; 
it would be a world of language and identity and 
equality and will. The true world would seem to be 
one to which humanity does not have access, be-
cause we have developed the inability to compre-
hend the "continuum." Nietzsche, however, is against 
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dualism in all its forms. He is against those who would 
disvalue the world of our senses for another world: 
All the philosophers have handled for thou-
sands of years have been concept mummies; 
nothing real escaped their grasp alive. [ ... ] 
Now they all believe, desperately even, in 
what has being. But since they never grasp 
it, they seek for reasons why it is kept from 
them. "There must be mere appearance, there 
must be some deception which prevents us 
from perceiving that which has being: where 
is the deceiver? 
"We have found him," they cry ecstatically; 
"it is the senses! These senses, which are so 
immoral in other ways too, deceive us con-
cerning the true world. "28 
When the harmful notion of the "true world" is 
abolished (though its abolition has not yet been fully 
recognized), Nietzsche asked "What world remained? 
The apparent one perhaps? But no! With the true 
world we have also abolished the apparent one. "29 
The world that is left to us is the world, the one and 
only world. According to Nietzsche, our senses do 
not deserve contempt for providing humanity with 
unreliable information about the world. The infor-
mation the senses present is wholly accurate; it is our 
interpretation of this information that is false. If any-
thing is to blame it is our consciousness (or our rea-
son) for once again causing "corruption, falsification, 
reduction to superficialities, and generalization . "30 
Despite Nietzsche's reluctance to divide the world 
in two, for practical purposes it is simply unavoid-
able. To describe the nature of freedom in Nietzsche's 
writings, one has to divide our knowledge into the 
metaphysical (the world as it is, the world of flux), 
and practical (the world as humans understand it, the 
world of identity and equality). But this division is 
not a division of the world itself; it is a division of our 
knowledge of the world. This division into "meta-
physical" and "practical" is arbitrary and in no way 
absolute. Like the use of cause and effect, the con-
cepts "metaphysical" and "practical" should only be 
used "as conventional fictions for the purpose of des-
ignation and communication - not for explana-
tions. "31 The remainder of this discussion on freedom 
will employ the duality of metaphysics and practical-
ity only as "conventional fictions. " 
For Nietzsche, the task of the philosopher is to 
find "the solution of the problem of value, the deter-
mination of the order and rank among values. "32 It is 
critically important to note that the task of the phi-
losopher is not to describe the nature of reality; that is 
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the task of the metaphysician/scientist/ cosmologist. 
Thus far, no philosophy (in Nietzsche's sense of the 
word) has actually been discussed in this essay, be-
cause all we have done is described the nature of 
reality. Philosophy for Nietzsche is a reaction to the 
knowledge of the metaphysical, a reaction that is 
confined to the realm of the practical. 
Nietzsche highlights this division: 
You have to believe in fate - science can 
compel you to. What then grows out of this 
belief in your case - cowardice, resignation 
or frankness and magnanimity- bears wit-
ness to the soil upon which that seedcorn 
has been scattered but not, however, to the 
seedcorn itself - for out of this anything 
and everything can grow. 33 
Here we see that fate (as opposed to the concept 
of free will) is a matter of science. It is the responsi-
bility of science to show that there is no free will. 
Philosophy, however, is concerned with "what then 
grows out of this belief. " Nietzsche does not believe 
that the knowledge of universal necessity is inher-
ently positive or negative; it is what one makes of it. 
Nietzsche describes two problematic responses 
to the knowledge of universal necessity which come 
from two "opposite standpoints:" 
some will not give up their 'responsibility,' 
their belief in themselves, the personal rights 
to their merits at any price (the vain races 
belong to this class) . Others, on the con-
trary, do not wish to be answerable for any-
thing, or blamed for anything, and owing to 
an inward self-contempt, seek to lay the 
blame for themselves somewhere else. 34 
A major concern in the philosophy of Nietzsche 
is the individual reaction to "the abysmal thoughts" 
that arise from the knowledge of unfreedom. 35 An 
individual is not truly free until he or she has come 
to terms with unfreedom, but this final stage is bur-
ied too deep within Nietzsche's philosophy to use as 
a starting point of discussion; to begin a survey of 
practical freedom in Nietzsche, one must first exam-
ine the "free spirit." 
On the practical level, an individual begins his 
or her life unfree. This is because one is born into a 
society of morality, responsibility, custom, and law. 
Nietzsche states, "With the aid of the morality of mo-
res and the social strai~acket, man was actually made 
calculable. "36 Man was made calculable and predict-
able in the practical sense because he was made 
"tame. " With man tame, an individual can predict that he or she will not 
be harmed by other individuals because everyone is wearing the "strait-
jacket" of morality. Not only is morality confining the individual, but the 
threat of punishment is also keeping individuals tame and predictable. 
Nietzsche recognizes the value that morality has had in the past to 
bring people to a level where they can live in society. But morality is 
something that must be overcome. Morality, by definition, is handed 
down from one generation to the next. The "Thou shalts" and the "Thou 
shalt nots " of morality are what proved useful to a past generation. The 
role of the current generation is simply to obey: 
morality is nothing other (therefore no more!) than obedience to 
customs, of whatever kind they may be; customs, however, are 
the traditional ways of behaving and evaluating. [ .. . ] What is 
tradition? A higher authority which one obeys, not because it 
commands what is useful to us, but because it commands.37 
Morality represents the wisdom of an age that no longer exists. It is 
knowledge that resulted from years of both successful and failed experi-
ments. However, one of the demands of morality is that all experimenta-
tion stops. Eventually it is forgotten that morality is the result of 
experimentation, and morality takes on the significance of a divine or 
natural law. In reality there is no divinity (therefore no divine law) and 
"nature is always value-less. "38 
The act of becoming free in the individual (and freedom in Nietzsche's 
writings was always viewed as the result of a conscious effort) 39 is the 
shedding of morality. Nietzsche states, "The free human being is im-
moral because in all things he is determined to depend upon himself and 
not upon tradition. "40 Society calls free individuals evil because they are 
disobedient to tradition. In this way, society offers "resistance" to free-
dom, and Nietzsche measures freedom "according to the resistance that 
must be overcome, according to the exertion required to remain on top." 
Accordingly, "the free man is a warrior. "41 
It is the freedom of the warrior that is preached by Zarathustra; how-
ever, the ultimate freedom lies beyond the warrior in the creator. 
Zarathustra envisions three stages of freedom in the individual, or "three 
metamorphoses of the spirit." First, the spirit "becomes a camel; and the 
camel, a lion; and the lion finally, a child. "42 In the first stage the spirit is 
indiscriminately loaded like a camel with knowledge and philosophy. At 
this stage of development the individual is not to judge among various 
philosophies; the individual is simply a student. As a camel, the spirit 
bears much on its back and speeds into the "desert" of philosophies. It is 
in this landscape, the "loneliest desert, " that the second metamorphosis 
takes place: 
Here the spirit becomes a lion who would conquer his freedom 
and be master in his own desert. Here he seeks out his last 
master: he wants to fight him and his last god; for ultimate vic-
tory he wants to fight with the great dragon.43 
This "last master" or "great dragon, " can be many things; this spirit's 
"last god" could be God, it could be social convention and morality, or it 
could just as easily be Nietzsche and his philosophy. No matter what this 
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last master is, it must be conquered by the individual 
in order to become free. It is not until this second 
stage, the stage of the lion, that the spirit has become 
free. 
Why go to war at all? What matters my freedom? 
These questions will plague the free spirit soon after 
it has broken free of its chains. Attaining freedom is 
pointless in itself, according to Nietzsche; the free spirit 
will realize that something is lacking: "Free from what? 
As if that mattered to Zarathustra! But your eyes 
should tell me brightly: free for what?"44 This 
newfound freedom is only a beginning, and a "freed" 
spirit will recognize this fact after tl1e triun1ph of the 
"victory" has worn off: 
A victory has been won - a victory? over 
what? over whom? An enigmatic, question-
packed, questionable victory, but the first vic-
tory nonetheless: such bad and painful things 
are part of the history of the great liberation. 
It is at the same time a sickness that can de-
stroy the man who has it, this first outbreak 
of strength and will to self determination, to 
evaluating on one's own account, this will to 
free will: and how much sickness is expressed 
in the wild experiments and singularities 
through which the liberated prisoner now 
seeks to demonstrate his mastery over 
things! "45 
In this state of sickness, the spirit now regards 
itself as metaphysically free because it feels the ex-
hilaration of practical freedom . The chains of custom 
and morality have been cast off, and '"freedom of 
will ' really means nothing other than feeling no new 
chains. "46 This freedom is an illusion, yet it is an 
illusion that Nietzsche embraces as a step toward true 
freedom. 
As a camel, the spirit longs for freedom but rec-
ognizes that it has much to learn before it can reject. 
As a lion, the spirit tears down without the capacity 
to rebuild, without tl1e capacity to create. Before writ-
ing Thus Spoke Zarathustra, Nietzsche said, "We can 
destroy only as creators. "47 But by the time of writing 
Zarathustra, Nietzsche saw that there was another 
option: nihilism. The philosophy of Nietzsche is an 
attempt to counter nihilism. The niliilist tears down 
without rebuilding; more accurately, the nihilist tears 
down and then attempts to erect nothingness, or a 
will to nothingness. The nihilist is "free from" but not 
"free for; " only the creator is "free for. " The free spirit 
must be "free for" the creation of new values, but 
freedom itself is not enough: 
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To create new values - that even the lion 
cannot do; but the creation of freedom for 
oneself for the new creation - that is within 
the power of the lion.48 
The final metamorphosis is needed in order to 
create new values: 
Why must the preying lion still become a 
child? The child is innocence and forgetting, 
a new beginning, a game, a self-propelled 
wheel, a first movement, a sacred "Yes." For 
the game of creation, my brothers, a sacred 
"Yes" is needed: the spirit now wills his own 
will, and he who had been lost to the world 
now conquers his own world.49 
The highest freedom of which Nietzsche conceives 
is not really freedom at all from the point of view of 
the "free spirit" or the "lion." The free spirit is free 
because he is bound by no chains, no laws, and no 
morality. In the final metamorphosis, where the spirit 
becomes like a child, it gives up this freedom as it 
becomes "the judge, the avenger, and the victim of its 
own law. "50 This subjection to law is the answer to 
Zarathustra's question: "free for what? " Zarathustra 
further questions whether the spirit is capable of such 
hardships: 
Can you give yourself your own evil and your 
own good and hang your own will over your-
self as law? Can you be your own judge and 
avenger of your law? Terrible it is to be alone 
with the judge and avenger of ones own law. 
Thus is the star thrown into the void and into 
the icy breath of solitude. 51 
As the creator of one's own law (as tl1e creator of 
good and evil} , the individual is no longer a "free 
spirit. " An apt title for such a creator is "philoso-
pher" because it is his or her task to determine the 
rank ordering of values. By creating one's own law 
the individual is determining this order of values. All 
"freedom" has been leading up to this point because 
"whoever must be a creator in good and evil, verily 
he must be an annihilator and break values. "52 How-
ever, it is not accurate to say that Nietzsche saw cre-
ators as unfree. What tl1ey possess is the freedom of 
self-mastery; they have ordered their drives, or in-
stincts, so as to create a strong and healthy self. 
Nietzsche states: "He who really possesses himself, 
that is to say he who has definitely conquered him-
self, henceforth regards it as his own privilege to pun-
ish himself, to pardon himself, to take pity on himself: 
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he does not need to concede this to anyone else. "53 
Zarathustra was a creator of his own law, but in 
creation he did not find ultimate freedom. This is 
because Zarathustra also possesses the knowledge of 
universal necessity. His case proves that "anything 
and everything" can grow out of the knowledge of 
fate. 54 What developed in Zarathustra was his "abys-
mal thought" which is based on his belief in the "eter-
nal recurrence." The eternal recurrence is the idea 
that all events repeat themselves exactly (and in ex-
actly the same order) over massive intervals of time. 
This idea is based on the notion of infinity. If three 
premises are true: 1. time is infinite. 2. energy is fi-
nite 3. the number of possible states of energy is 
finite - then every possible state that this energy could 
be in will eventually occur, and every state will occur 
an infinite number of times. Therefore, everything 
that is happening now has already happened an infi-
nite number of times in the past and will happen an 
infinite number of times in the future. It is not clear 
to what degree Nietzsche actually believed in the eter-
nal recurrence, but nevertheless it still troubles 
Zarathustra greatly. Zarathustra knows that if he is 
going to return infinitely, then the rabble (or the com-
mon man) will also return. 
Even if one does not believe in the eternal recur-
rence, everyone who understands the doctrine of uni-
versal necessity should encounter a similar problem: 
For the world to be the way it is now, everything that 
has happened (the good and the bad) was necessary. 
Likewise, for me to exist now, even the rabble has to 
exist now. Alexander Nehamas doesn't believe that 
the eternal recurrence needs to be true for the psy-
chological consequences to be the same. He clarifies 
this point as follows: 
Nietzsche believes that every event in the 
world is inextricably connected with every 
other; he believes that if anything had oc-
curred differently, everything would have 
occurred differently, that if anything happened 
again, everything would happen again. He 
thinks the history of the world or (in more 
modest terms) the history of each person is 
implicit in every moment.55 
It is this insight that allows Zarathustra to con-
quer his "abysmal thought." He realizes everything is 
necessary for his existence, even the rabble. When 
Zarathustra was able to overcome tl1is demon, "he 
jumped up. No longer shepherd, no longer human 
- one changed, radiant, laughing!" 56 Zarathustra 
learned amor fati, or "love of fate." Not only did he 
desire that his life be as it is and as it was and as it 
will be, but also that everything be as it is and as it 
was and as it will be. If there were no rabble, there would be no 
Zarathustra . If Zarathustra did not experience all of the hardships, evils, 
and sicknesses in his own life, then he would not be Zarathustra. 
Nietzsche himself demonstrated throughout his life a remarkable grati-
tude for all of his experiences, despite the fact that his life was one of 
incredible physical suffering and loneliness: 
My formula for greatness in a human being is amor fati: that 
one wants nothing to be different, not forward, not backward, 
not in all eternity. Not merely to bear what is necessary, still 
less conceal it - all idealism is mendaciousness in the face of 
what is necessary- but love itY 
Zarathustra alone seems capable of reconciling freedom and neces-
sity: "in him all opposites are blended into a new unity. "58 Is Zarathustra 
"living the knowledge" of universal necessity or is he still trapped in the 
illusion of free will? In the character of Zarathustra there seems to be a 
unity of both freedom and necessity; he seems to live the knowledge to 
the highest degree that one should live it. It is possible that one could 
reject this world to such degree that he or she acquires some mystical 
insight into this "unfolding. " Such an individual, however, would come 
under sharp criticism from Nietzsche because of this negating, ascetic 
drive. Nietzsche finds fault with all those who have a "will to nothing-
ness," be they Buddhists or Christians or anyone who strives for the 
beyond. Nietzsche stresses tl1at this is the only world that exists, and 
even if there were a metaphysical beyond, we would have no access to 
it. 
Zarathustra seems to have found a middle ground between idealism 
and realism. Nietzsche would not agree with this estimation because 
Nietzsche believes that he and Zarathustra are the ultimate realists: 
Zarathustra is more truthful than any other thinker. His doc-
trine, and his alone, posits truthfulness as the highest virtue; 
this means the opposite of the cowardice of the "idealist" who 
flees from reality. 59 
Nietzsche is right to call idealism cowardice, but he is wrong to say 
that Zarathustra is the paradigm of realism. The fact that freedom is 
taught by Zarathustra despite the fact that it does not exist is not an 
example of realism. The teaching of freedom is the result of Nietzsche's 
cowardice in the face of reality. Is the "creation of value" taught by 
Zarathustra anything more than the creation of ideals? The freedom of 
the "free spirit" is an ideal that has been erected on a foundation of 
illusion and error. Nietzsche would call freedom a value, not an ideal, 
but that does not clear him from the charge of idealism. 
For a human, there is no escaping idealism. What makes one hu-
man is the process of valuing. Valuation should be taken seriously, but 
at the same time it requires "laughter" above all. This laughter is a result 
of the knowledge tl1at "only we have created the world that concerns 
man." 60 An individual can laugh at the fact that although much of our 
understanding is based on error, we still must live in this world of error. 
One can divide freedom into metaphysical and practical, but that does 
not change the fact that there is no free will . Nietzsche said, "The 'un-
free will ' is mythology; in real life it is only a matter of strong and weak 
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wills. "61 The key to understanding this sentence is the phrase "real life. " 
In "real life," or "the world that concerns man," there is freedom, but we 
created it. The sentence that Nietzsche should have added next is: "Strong 
and weak wills are mythology, in reality it is only a matter of necessity. " 
In the end, it is Zarathustra to whom we must look for an example 
of how to live life (how to live a free life) with the knowledge of univer-
sal necessity. Zarathustra's life helps illuminate the ambiguous middle 
ground between idealism and realism. Most importantly he illustrates 
the doctrine of amor fati , or love of fate. It is inaccurate to say that those 
who believe in free will cannot be happy, but a higher happiness is 
reserved for those who have put such simplistic notions out of their 
head. One has to love the necessity found in the world. The highest 
freedom ultimately comes from the knowledge of unfreedom. 
Bibliography 
Nehamas, Alexander. "The Eternal Recurrence." The Philosophical Review 89:3 
(1980) : 331 -356. 
Nietzsche, Friedrich. "The Antichrist. " The Portable Nietzsche. Trans. Walter 
Kaufmann. New York: Penguin, 1982. 565-656. [AC] 
"Beyond Good and Evil. " Basic Writings of Nietzsche. Trans. Walter Kaufmann. 
New York: Modern Library, 2000. 179-435. [BGE] 
Daybreak. Trans. R. J. Hollingdale. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997. 
[DAY] 
"Ecce Homo." Basic Writings of Nietzsche. 1Ians. Walter Kaufmann. New York: 
Modern Library, 2000. 655-800. [EH] 
The Gay Science. Trans. Walter Kaufmann . New York: Vintage, 1974. [GS] 
"Genealogy of Morals." Basic Writings of Nietzsche. Trans. Walter Kaufmann. 
New York: Modern Library, 2000. 437-599. [GM] 
Human, All Too Human. Trans. R. J. Hollingdale. Cambridge: Cambridge Uni-
versity Press, 1996. [HAH] 
"Richard Wagner in Bayreuth." Untimely M editations. Trans. R. J . Hollingdale. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997. 195-254. [RWB] 
"Thus Spoke Zarathustra." The Portable Nietzsche. Trans. Walter Kaufmann . 
New York: Penguin, 1982. 103-439. [TSZ] 
"Twilight of the Idols." The Portable Nietzsche. Trans. Walter Kaufmann . New 
York: Penguin, 1982. 463-563 [TI] 
Endnotes 
1 Citations from Nietzsche's works are by page number and are abbreviated. 
The abbreviations used are shown in square brackets in the bibliography 
entries. 
2 EH 761 
3 BGE 218 
4 TI 491 
5 EH 739 
6 GM 492 
7 HAH 57 
8 BGE 219 
9 GS 173 
10 Ibid . 169 
II Ibid. 168 
12 BGE 220 
13 Ibid. 220-21 
14 Nietzsche cannot be absolutely right because, as a human being, he is limited 
to seeing the world from perspectives. 
15 GS 171 
16 BGE 219 
17 GS 297 
18 Tbid . 298 
19 Ibid . 298 
20 Ibid . 299 
21 GM 520 
22 GS 299-300 
23 GM 481 
24 Ibid . 481 
25 GS 242 
26 Ibid. 299-300 
27 HAH 57-58 
28 TI 479-80 
29 TI 486 
30 GS 299-300 
31 BGE 219 
32 GM 492 
33 HAH 293 
34 BGE 21 9 
GEORGE YouNGER ) 
35 Zarathustra 's "abysmal thought" is discussed later. 
36 GM 495 
37 DAY 10-11 
38 GS 242 
39 In Richard Wagner in Bayreuth, Nietzsche says, "He who 
wants to become free has to become through his own 
actions and ... freedom falls into no one's lap like a 
miraculous gift." P. 252 . 
40 DAY 10 
41 TI 542 
42 TSZ 137 
43 Ibid. 138 
44 TSZ 175 
45 HAH 7 
46 Ibid . 306 
47 GS 122 
48 TSZ 139 
49 Ibid. 139 
50 Ibid. 226 
51 Ibid. 175 
52 TSZ 228 
53 DAY 186-7 
54 HAH 293 
55 Nehamas, 1980, p. 337. 
56 TSZ 272 
57 EH 714 
58 Ibid. 761 
59 Ibid. 784 
60 GS 242 
61 BGE 219 
( THE UNIVERSITY OF KENTUC KY JOURNAL OF UND ERGRADUATE SCHOLARSH IP) 63 
